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Abstract 
A major purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of poor 
governance or ‘state fragility’ in African countries on their overall 
economic and agrarian performance. The results of our econometric 
analysis show that a higher level of public security is conducive to lower 
levels of conflict, whether of an ethnic, religious and regional nature.  It 
also corresponds with greater agricultural value-added per capita. The 
analysis further indicates that trade openness and aid do not have a 
substantial impact on agricultural development. 
 
Our institutional and historical examination of the structural adjustment 
programmes in African countries suggest that African agriculture’s poor 
performance is not necessarily due to the negative influence of African 
governments, but could also, in large part, be attributed to the policies 
advocated by the international financial institutions and donor countries. 
The resolution of the problems associated with these policies lies in 
improving the ability of African farmers to benefit from new agrarian 
technologies that raise staple food productivity and thereby enhance food 
security and national stability. 
 
 
The paper also provides, inter alia, a nuanced analytical description, 
based upon available aggregate statistics, of the short- and long-term 
performance of African economies and their agricultural sectors during 
the last 25 years. 
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policies 
 
JEL Codes: 013, 055, 015, QO1, Q18 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This paper was prepared for the workshop on Food Crisis and the 
development potential of the agricultural sector in fragile countries 
organised by the European Report of Development in Cambridge, UK 17-
18 March 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Further information about the Centre for Business Research can be found 
at www.cbr.cam.ac.uk 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This is a revised version of the paper, presented at the European Report 
on Development (ERD) conference on Food Crisis and the Development 
Potential of the Agricultural and Commodities Sector in Fragile Countries 
held at Jesus College Cambridge in March 2009.  The revisions take into 
account the discussant’s and other comments made at the conference and 
above all the critical but generally constructive comments of an 
anonymous referee appointed by ERD.  The paper has been extensively 
recast to address the concerns of the referee and to make more of a 
contribution to ERD’s research and policy programmes. Specifically, 
using aggregate data for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the paper begins 
by examining over time the overall performance of African economies as 
well as those of their food and agricultural sectors.  The recent record of 
these economies is assessed in a long-term historical and comparative 
perspective.  The paper has three limited objectives. 
 
The first is to provide a nuanced analytical description of the short term 
and long-term performance of African economies and their agricultural 
sectors during the last 25 years.  There is a general perception that 
African economies overall as well as their agricultural sectors have 
performed poorly over the years, and that prospects for African economic 
development are not very bright.  However, as the relevant statistics on 
these topics which will be presented in the next section will indicate, the 
popular perception is at best only half correct. The data will show that the 
overall economic record of the African economies during the recent 
period up to 2007 has been highly creditable1 by comparative 
international standards as well as by sub-Saharan Africa’s own previous 
record.  On the other hand, the agricultural sector, particularly food 
production has not performed so well. The main issues raised by these 
developments are a.) the sustainability of the fast economic growth of the 
last five years, and b.) how best to produce more food and to enhance 
efficient agricultural production.  
 
A second purpose of the present paper is to examine the effects of state 
fragility in African countries on their overall economic and agrarian 
performance.  State fragility in its mildest form is often depicted in terms 
of government failure to protect property rights or enforce contracts that 
make the achievement of fast economic growth difficult. Neither at an 
operational level nor at the conceptual level is there any consensus on the 
definition of fragility. The conceptual issues in relation to fragility will be 
taken up in the next section. In considering the operational formulations 
of fragility here, we note the differences between donor agencies.  
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Thus DFID (2005 p7) in the UK defines ‘fragile states’ as ‘those 
countries where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions 
to the majority of their people, including the poor.’ The report suggests 
‘there are wider reasons why we need to work better in fragile states. 
They are more likely to become unstable, to destabilise their neighbours, 
to create refugee flows, to spread disease and to be bases for terrorists.’ 
(DFID 2005 p7) The World Bank’s classification of Low-Income 
Countries Under Stress (LICUS) considers 7 countries classified as 
‘severe’ fragile states and the other 19 as ‘core’ fragile states. USAID 
chooses yet another criteria for calling a state fragile. 
 
In the light of this heterogeneity of views on what is fragility we have in 
this essay put forward a new definition of fragility, which identifies it 
with the ability of the state to provide basic physical protection against 
violence, injury or death to its citizens and against arbitrary encroachment 
upon private property. Many people would regard the latter as a primary 
obligation of the state and its inability to provide such security would 
suggest the state has failed and is ‘fragile’.  It will be interesting to see 
whether this definition of ‘fragility’ produces results similar to those 
based on the concept of fragility used elsewhere in the literature.  These 
issues, together with the econometric analysis of the empirical evidence 
bearing on them will be considered in section IV.   
 
In addition to providing (i) an analytical narrative about the growth of the 
sub-Saharan African agrarian economy, as well as of the economy as a 
whole in both the short and long terms, (ii) examining the economic 
effects of a particular formulation of the concept of state fragility, the 3rd 
objective of the paper is to consider another important causal factor 
which is often invoked to explain the poor long-term African agricultural 
and economic performance. This hypothesis suggests that the African 
deficit was aggravated if not caused by the structural adjustment 
programmes of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as well as 
the major donor countries. Outside these international agencies and donor 
governments many independent observers [see for example Havnevik 
(2007), Round (2007)] as well as NGOs [see for example Christian Aid 
(2007), Bello (2008)] argue that these structural adjustment programmes 
with their neo-liberal agenda were misconceived and they undermined the 
role of the government in all spheres of agricultural development and 
were, for that reason, particularly harmful to small holder African 
farmers. This is clearly, for an ERD, a sensitive matter but one which 
cannot be avoided if the Report is to have any credibility. We provide a 
contribution to this subject for consideration by ERD based on historical 
and institutional analysis. A full discussion of this issue with reference to 
the relevant literature will be provided in section IV. 
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It will be appreciated that in a short paper the above subjects can only be 
examined to a limited degree. Nevertheless, we hope that these 
contributions will assist the ERD to arrive at balanced and practical 
conclusions from a policy perspective. The stakes are indeed high. Africa 
now has a chance to maintain the momentum and build on its short-term 
economic successes with the help of appropriate policies. Unfortunately, 
the world financial turmoil, for which Africa is not at all responsible, has 
made this task far more challenging. 
 
(Readers may wish to bear in mind that the words ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
and ‘Africa’ have been used interchangeably in the following account). 
 
2. Agrarian Economy and Overall Economic Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
Contrary to the widely accepted negative image of African economic 
development, there has recently been a huge improvement in the region’s 
economic outcomes.  As Table 1 indicates, between 2003 and 2007 
African economies registered an overall per capita GDP growth rate of a 
respectable 3% per annum.  Although most other developing continents 
and regions did better, it was nevertheless an enormous improvement for 
African countries compared with their own past, especially in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  In 2007 the Sub-Saharan African economies registered a 
growth rate of 6% per annum, one of the highest rates recorded by them 
during any year over the last quarter of a century.  Apart from the recent 
recovery of the African economies, Table 1 also highlights their long-
term poor performance.  During the 1980s, the so-called ‘lost decade’ in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, per capita GDP contracted at a rate of 0.5% per 
annum.  In the 1990s per capita GDP did rise, but at an extremely slow 
rate. Thus over the 26-year time span covered by Table 1, the African 
economies expanded by barely 16%, while East and South Asia grew by 
317%.  All developing countries taken together recorded a per capita 
increase of more than 100% over this period. However, to be fair, the 
1980s and 1990s were not only bad for Africa, but also for Latin America 
and West Asia.  
 
Most observers will agree that an approximate cause of the improved 
African economic performance during the last 5 years or so has clearly 
been the rise in commodity prices.1  The commodity producers and 
exporters not only gain directly from the rising commodity prices but also 
indirectly through the relaxation of balance of payments constraints, 
which most developing countries are subject to.  Although during the last 
five years or so the prices of minerals, ores, and metals rose far more than 
4 
 
for food and agricultural raw materials, the latter also recorded a healthy 
rise (see Table 2).  Agriculture would also have benefited from this 
economy-wide upturn. As Table 3 indicates, the growth rate in value-
added in agriculture over the 15-year period 1990-92—2005-072 was 3% 
per annum, which is greater than the average growth rate for developing 
countries as a whole. This, on the face of it, suggests no great crisis for 
African agriculture in the most recent period. It may be noted that the 
population growth rate in the African case was higher than that of other 
regions and therefore, measured in per capita terms African agriculture 
did not perform so well. 
 
However, during the period 1990-92—2002-4 food production in Sub-
Saharan Africa expanded at a rate of only 2.8% per annum, which was 
the lowest of all regions shown in Table 4. Similarly, the results of the 
regression analysis in Table 5 show that the trend rate of growth of Sub-
Saharan food production since 1970 has been 2.3%, and that of value-
added in agriculture has been 2.5%. The corresponding trend growth rate 
of population has been 2.7%, leading to a per capita decline in food 
production and agricultural production.3 Data for individual countries 
confirm falling per capita food production, which was aggravated by a) 
the economic policy regime that operated in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1980s and 1990s and b) by globalization. These points will be considered 
in full detail in the following sections. As Walden Bello (2008) notes:  
 
At the time of decolonization in the 1960s, Africa was not just self-
sufficient in food but was actually a net food exporter, its exports 
averaging 1.3 million tons a year between 1966-70. Today, the 
continent imports 25% of its food, with almost every country being a 
net food importer. Hunger and famine have become recurrent 
phenomena, with the last three years alone seeing food emergencies 
break out in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Southern Africa, and 
Central Africa. 
 
So far, we observe a picture of long-term failure in African agriculture, 
but also glimpse a short-term improvement as a consequence of the rise in 
commodity prices and the consequent relaxation of the balance of 
payments constraint. The important question is whether these recent 
improvements will be sustainable. As Bailey, Lenihan and Singh 
(forthcoming) observe:  
 
The good record of African economic growth between 1950 and 1973 
when these economies expanded at a rate of nearly 5% per annum 
could not subsequently be sustained. Similarly, during the 1990s a 
number of countries were successively selected as the ‘African success 
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story’ by the Bretton Woods Institutions, none of which could actually 
maintain fast growth for more than 2-3 years (Mkandawire, 2005). 
Such economic history invites scepticism about the ability of African 
countries to convert their recent favourable changes in the terms of 
trade into lasting progress.  
 
There are however important counter-arguments that are an equally 
essential part of the story. First, the human capital situation in Sub-
Saharan Africa is much better today than it was in the 1950s and 60s. 
New universities and teaching institutions of various kinds have been 
established throughout Africa and should help sustain the new gains. 
Similarly and equally importantly, the World Bank structural adjustment 
policies based on the Washington consensus framework have been 
discredited by their widespread failure in practice.4 This suggests a new 
policy regime more favourable to agriculture and food production may be 
instituted.  
 
Table 6 provides information on the economic structures of the various 
regions (columns 4-6) as well as changes in agricultural productivity per 
capita over time (columns 1-3). The latter variable, which is a long-term 
indicator of agricultural development, has a very low value in African 
countries. However, the information in columns 4-6 on comparative 
economic structures of different developing regions is not very helpful in 
indicating the desirability or otherwise of the economic structures in the 
various regions. In some respects the information on the various 
structures is grossly misleading. For example, the table shows that 
industry in Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for a greater proportion of 
GDP in this region than did industry in South Asia (32% versus 28%), 
implying in terms of received theory that industry is more developed in 
the former region that in South Asia. This interpretation flies in the face 
of all available evidence. Similarly, the lower proportion of GDP 
accounted for by agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa than in South Asia is 
not an indicator of more desirable structural change experienced by the 
former. Indeed without a satisfactory theory of optimal structure and 
structural change, it is not possible to draw any meaningful conclusion 
from these statistics.5 A lower share of agriculture in GDP could imply a 
premature de-agrarianization of the region than a step towards positive 
structural change.  
 
To sum up, on balance the evidence suggests that notwithstanding some 
recent improvements in African agriculture, its long-term performance 
has been poor. Two kinds of causal hypotheses concerning this failure 
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have been outlined. These will be dwelt further and empirically examined 
in the following sections.  
 
3. African Economic and Agrarian Failure and State Fragility 
 
One of the important hypotheses concerning the long-term poor 
agricultural performance in African countries is that of so-called ‘poor 
governance’. It is argued that a lack of democratic governance 
mechanisms, corruption and more fundamentally the rule of law, lack of 
protection of private property, the state inability or failure to enforce 
contracts are responsible for economic failure in general and for 
agricultural failure in particular.  Understanding the nature of the African 
state through the performance of African agriculture has led to an 
examination of the policies in operation in the agricultural sector and an 
evaluation of the institutional capacity and support provided by the state 
for measures of governance. At one end, is located the case of the 
developmental state with its powerful, competent and insulated 
bureaucracy (Leftwich, 1995) and at the other there is the fragile or 
failing state that is mired in political and policy disasters (Mkandawire, 
1998; Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005). The inability of the state to deliver 
development objectives has given rise to criteria for identifying fragile 
states being set out by international financial institutions and donor 
agencies to assess the challenges that they face in working with such 
countries (OECD 2007).   
 
Stewart and Brown (2009) review the relative merits of the definitions of 
state fragility circulating within international donor agencies and come up 
with a threefold-typology of state fragility that encompasses the 
dimensions of authority failure, service failure and legitimacy failure and 
could be used to understand such fragility/failure. In this analysis, 
authority failure occurs when the state lacks the authority to protect its 
citizens from civil and/or ethnic violence and the ensuring conflict arising 
from civil war. In the instance where there is service failure the state 
becomes unable to ensure service entitlements, particularly in the areas of 
health services, basic education, water and sanitation, basic transport and 
infrastructure, and poverty reduction. In the situation of legitimacy 
failure, the state has only limited support among citizens, and often 
associated with a dominant military presence in government and a limited 
or no presence of democratic features: such as elections, media freedom, 
and civil and political liberties.  
 
While there is little reference made with regard to either the state of 
agriculture, or policies undertaken therein, within the state fragility 
literature, it is possible to extrapolate how this new definition might be 
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used to locate the agricultural context. For instance, poor institutional 
capacity can result in service failure, as in the case of marketing and 
subsidy programmes in Africa. Ethnic conflict can increase on account of 
large differences in land ownership across ethnic groups (cf. case of 
Guatemala in Stewart and Brown 2009).    
 
In the context of African agriculture, the failures of governance have not 
been the only cause of a faltering rate of growth. There has also been a 
reduction in the aid spent on agriculture and rural development over the 
last two decades (Fan and Rao, 2003; DFID, 2004). This trend reflects the 
low priority accorded to agriculture and rural development in donor 
policies as well as being a consequence of the lack of consistency 
between development agencies agendas and policies (Eicher, 2003; 
Maxwell, 2003). 6 
  
In this context the ability of the state to create new agricultural policies 
and programmes could be regarded as a sign of growing institutional 
capacity. The importance of the domestic actors, particularly key figures 
in the Ministry of Agriculture in directing policies and owning processes, 
in critical in ensuring service delivery. The ability of the state to create 
domestic policies, even when thee is opposition by international agencies 
is another form of evidence of the growing legitimacy of governance in 
the country (Cabral and Scoones 2006). In the case of Malawi’s new 
subsidy programme of 2005-06, the consequence was bringing together 
ruling and opposition parties to ensure food security. However, the initial 
success of this agricultural programme should not be interpreted as long-
term interest in supporting the agricultural sector but short-term interest 
in ensuring the political survival of key state actors (Chinsinga, 2007).  
 
The poor outcomes of agricultural policies on the performance of African 
agriculture have been attributed to low institutional capacity. In 
particular, the role played by domestic and international institutions in 
sub-Saharan Africa can be analysed to understand the extent to which 
state fragility could be an explanation for poor agricultural performance. 
The nature of the failure(s) using the Stewart and Brown classification 
would provide insights as to the particular trigger that operates in these 
fragile contexts. If there is evidence of authority fragility then conflict 
would be the expected outcome, and it would be useful to unpick the 
particular driver was ethnic rivalry or civil breakdown. In the case where 
there was a fall in service entitlements then this would emerge as a form 
of service failure. What is less clear is whether the service failure was on 
account of poor governance in the domestic sector or due to a steep 
reduction in international aid to African agriculture.  
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As indicated earlier in the econometric work in this essay we use a 
different but entirely defensible definition of fragility requiring the state 
to provide essential protection against the loss of life and property.  There 
is recently available French data on this issue of personal security, which 
allows us to examine the impact of fragility as defined here on agriculture 
and food production in African countries.  This task is carried out in 
section (iv) below. 
 
4. State Fragility Factors and Sub-Saharan Agriculture: A Panel 
Data Analysis 
 
The main hypothesis that will be tested in this section is that state 
fragility as defined below has a negative influence on agriculture and 
food production.  We give the variables used in analysis and the data 
sources below. 
 
4.1  Influence of state fragility factors 
 
From the World Bank source (World Development Indicators) we get 
data on the value added in agriculture (measured in internationally 
comparable constant dollar) for 17 Sub-Saharan countries: Benin, 
Burkina-Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Sénégal, Chad, Uganda, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe.  To control for size we have deflated the value 
added figures by the countries’ population figures (obtained from the 
same source).  This per capita value added in agriculture is used as the 
proxy for agricultural development (our dependent variable).  Our 
objective is to examine at the cross-country panel level the influence of 
state fragility and other institutions on Sub-Saharan agriculture after 
taking into account other factors (which may influence agricultural 
development through infrastructural development, opening up of the 
market, general health or quality of life etc) such as FDI as a % of GDP 
(FDIY), aid per capita (AIDPC) and openness indicator, trade (export 
plus import)-GDP ratio, TRDY (these data are also available from the 
same World Bank source mentioned above).   
 
From the database called  ‘Profils Institutionnels’ (available on line: 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsInstitutionnelsDatabase.htm) built by the 
researchers at the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry 
(MINEFE) and the French Development Agency (AFD) we can obtain 
detailed data (based on 2006 survey) relating to different aspects of 
institutions for a large number of countries including 17 Sub-Saharan 
countries covered in this study.  For details of the methodology of the 
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construction of this dataset see Meisel and Aoudia (2007).  Recently 
Kaufmann et al (2008) started using this dataset for their study of 
institutions.   
 
Without getting bogged down into the detailed discussion of the 
definition of state fragility (see Sarkar, 2008 for such discussion) we use 
the functional or operational definition.  We think that the first causality 
in a fragile state is the internal public security (security of life and 
property of the general public at large).  In the French dataset we find the 
information on internal public security of different countries– variable 
A200.  It also provided quantitative data (in a scale of 1 to 4 – very low to 
very high) on the following interrelated factors: 
 
1. Security of persons and goods, A2000; 
2. Conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature, A2001; 
3. Violent actions by underground political organizations, A2002; 
4. Organized criminal activity (drug-trafficking, arms-trafficking), 
A2003, and 
5. Violent social conflicts, A2004. 
 
These are aggregated into a single variable, A200 by the weighted 
average (with the weight of a factor being its standard deviation 
measuring variations of that factor across all the countries covered by the 
dataset).  There is high correlation among the five factors and we find that 
A2001 and A2004 are the two variables (having no significant correlation 
between them) explaining all the five variables.  As an indicator of state 
fragility we shall consider these two variables or alternatively we shall 
use the aggregate variable (A200).  Principal component analysis (based 
on the data for 17 sub-Saharan countries) identifies the A2004 (Violent 
social conflicts) as the most important factor explaining the cross-country 
variations with the standardised weight of 0.25 followed by A2001 
(Conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature) and A2002 (Violent 
actions by underground political organizations) with the identical weight 
0.2 (Table 7).   
 
We have also considered another variable, evolution of the security in the 
past 3 years (A250); it is based on the answers given by the investigators 
to the following question: in the past 3 years, has public security in your 
view substantially improved (4), moderately improved (3), remained 
stable (2), deteriorated (1) or severely deteriorated (0)? 
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 As the period of analysis we have considered 2001-2006 – roughly this is 
the period of relevance for the data on state fragility (the first survey for 
the construction of French dataset began in 2001).  We did not look for a 
long period data on state fragility index as the kind of data generated in 
various works are not often inter-temporarily comparable in the same 
precise manner as one can think of purchasing power parity adjusted 
GDP or agricultural value added.  Again we do not like to set aside the 
benefits of using panel data methodology vis-à-vis the OLS analysis of 
cross-country averages. So we have used the short-period (2001-2006) 
panel data and applied a special type of methodology, ‘‘fixed effects 
vector decomposition’’ (FEVD) methodology (details below) that is 
devised by some political scientists (see Plümper and Troegerhis, 2007).   
 
4.2 Using FEVD panel data methodology 
 
In a cross-country analysis one crucial problem crops up due to country 
specific omitted variables – different countries have different histories, 
cultures and many institutional and/or socio-psychological factors that are 
not included in the analysis either due to ignorance or due to non-
availability of data or a mixture of both.  These omitted variables often 
influence the variables on the right hand side and create a bias in the 
estimates. So often a fixed effect (FE) model is used to eliminate the 
effect of these omitted variables through differencing or demeaning the 
data.  But this procedure would eliminate all the (time-invariant) 
institutional variables included in our study.  A random effect model can 
retain these variables but cannot take into account the omitted variable 
bias – correlation among the variables included on the right hand side and 
the variables that are not included (unobserved country specific factors).     
As a way-out of this impasse the ‘‘fixed effects vector decomposition’’ 
(FEVD) methodology has been devised by Plümper and Troegerhis 
(2007); it is specially designed to tackle this type of scenario.  It is a 
three-stage procedure for the estimation of time-invariant and rarely 
changing variables in panel data models with fixed effects.  The first 
stage of the estimator runs a fixed-effects model to obtain the fixed 
effects, the second stage breaks down the fixed effects into a part 
explained by the time-invariant and/or rarely changing variables and an 
error term, and the third stage re-estimates the first stage by pooled OLS 
including the time-invariant variables plus the error term of stage 2, 
which then accounts for the unexplained part of the fixed effects.  We 
have conducted Hausman tests, which suggest that our FEVD estimates 
are efficient in comparison to random effect estimates.  Although we have 
panel data for six years but Durbin-Watson statistic indicates some 
possibility of first order autocorrelation in each case. So we have used 
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AR (1) Prais-Winsten transformation for curing the problem of 
autocorrelation in the residuals (Table 8). 
 
Our estimates in Table 8 show that a country with a higher public security 
(a higher A200) consequent upon a better scenario regarding conflicts of 
ethnic, religious, regional nature (A2001) experiences a favourable effect 
on agricultural value added (per capita).  An improvement in the security 
scenario (a higher A250) favours agricultural development.  We did not 
find any significant effect of FDI, trade openness and aid on agricultural 
development.  These are the main conclusions of the econometric 
analysis of this section.  However we have also considered some other 
institutional data available from the same French source: one is 
concerning the proportion of administered prices and market prices 
(including direct subsidies on prices of primary products) and the variable 
(B403) capturing all these varies from 1 = large proportion to 4 = very 
small proportion or nil. The other one is concerning concentration of 
agricultural land (B703); it varies from 1 = highly concentrated to 4 = 
highly dispersed.  The former has negative coefficient (implying the 
larger the proportion of administered prices so that the lower is B403, the 
higher is the agricultural value added per capita) and the latter has 
positive coefficient (implying the more dispersed land ownership the 
higher is the agricultural value added per capita). 
 
It is also interesting to note that our conclusion of a negative effect of 
fragility on agriculture value added is not found in other studies. As 
Bourguignon et al, 2008, has noted, ‘if there is a clear difference between 
the two groups of countries (fragile and non fragile states) in terms of 
levels of the various indicators, the distinction between fragile and non-
fragile states explains very little of the variability in terms of rates of 
change of MDG indicators. In other words, the variability of performance 
remains extremely high within both fragile and non-fragile state groups. 
Fragile states like Ethiopia or Cambodia witnessed rapid poverty 
reduction performance, while in other fragile states like Niger, Nigeria 
and Zimbabwe poverty increased dramatically over the period.’ (pg. 8)  
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5. Globalisation, Structural Adjustment and Smallholder Agriculture 
in Africa 
 
In discussing agricultural failure, fragile states and public insecurity, it is 
important to understand how these outcomes evolved.  Much of the failed 
state literature in our view relies heavily on a historical characterization 
of African governments and cultural predispositions (Bayart et al. 1999, 
Chabal and Daloze 1999, 2005).  It is necessary to trace the origins of 
agricultural decline to understand the historical processes and cause-
effect relationships that have generated the present circumstances.  In 
understanding such evolutionary changes in these social institutions, 
econometric analysis is not very helpful.  One is obliged to follow in the 
footsteps of other social scientists and use historical and institutional 
analysis, which is what is implemented in the following discourse. 
 
5.1 Role of Smallholder Agriculture in African Economies and 
Politics 
 
The importance of peasant agriculture to African non-mining economies 
and states cannot be over-emphasized.  Peasant cash crop producers 
provided the political force behind the African national independence 
movements that swept the continent in the 1950s and formed the 
foundation for the economies of the newly independent countries that 
came into being in the 1960s.  During that decade African countries’ 
economic performance was promising.  African and Asian countries were 
part of the ‘third world’ destined for eventual achievement of the first 
world’s higher standards of living.  
 
Western donor agencies actively supported health, education and 
infrastructure programs deliberately targeted at rural rather than urban 
areas.  A severe famine in the Sahel in the early 1970s underscored the 
importance of food security as a prerequisite for development.  Hence UN 
agencies and bilateral donors prioritized the modernization of peasant 
agricultural.  The success of Green Revolution investments in raising rice 
and wheat yields in South Asia during the 1960s led African governments 
and donors to put concerted effort behind developing staple food 
improvement packages especially for maize. Beginning in the 1970s, 
peasant farmers in many African countries participated in subsidized 
fertilizer and seed programs and began to experience increasing yields 
(Bryceson 1990, Oluoch-Kosura and Karugia 2005). 
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5.2 Oil crises, SAP and the Short-circuiting of African Green 
Revolution Efforts  
 
The improving staple food yields, however, were short-lived.  In the mid-
1970s, the economic shock of the oil crises undermined African peasants’ 
prospects and their national economies.  Most African governments had 
established agricultural parastatals to handle the marketing of the widely 
fluctuating stocks of commercial staple food crops produced by peasants.  
Peasant farmers in many countries had been availed fixed pan-territorial 
prices regardless of the distance that they were located from urban centres 
of staple food demand.  This, in addition to peasant farmers’ subsidized 
crop input packages, had successfully incentivized peasant grain 
production.  But at the time of the oil crisis, as the cost of surface 
transport escalated, parastatal finances became severely stretched.  This 
marked a turning point in the tripartite relationship between peasant 
producers, state infrastructure providers and the global market.  
 
Peasant households were scattered throughout the length and breadth of 
an immense continent.  Rising oil prices quickly undermined the 
competitiveness of their agricultural exports, which had to be transported 
exceptionally long distances to ports.  Many African governments found 
it cheaper to rely on foreign imports of maize, rice and wheat to feed the 
cities (Andræ and Beckman 1985).  
 
Meanwhile, they became heavily indebted. By the end of the 1970s most 
were forced to seek debt financing from the IMF. In doing so, the World 
Bank and IMF gained leverage and eventually the lead in African policy 
formulation, a lead that African governments, in the main, have failed to 
regain.  In the context of rising neo-liberal thinking connected with the 
influence of Reagan and Thatcher on the world stage, the World Bank 
diagnosed that the continent’s decline was due to over-involvement of 
African states.  Structural adjustment programs (SAP) had the two-
pronged agenda of reducing the role of the state in the economy and 
cutting back on state provisioned infrastructure and services.    
 
SAP spelled the end of attempts to raise peasant staple food yields. 
Fertilizer and seed subsidy packages were retracted. FAO statistics show 
an upward trend in grain output on a par with Asia, which then levelled 
off and diverged from Asia7 in the 1980s as subsidized crop input 
programs collapsed and yields on unfertilized soils declined.  Peasant 
farmers, having seen the difference that fertilizer application could make, 
deeply resented this setback blaming the state for the subsidy removal.  
Subsidies and support for export cash crops were similarly affected. 
International financial institution-enforced economic liberalization 
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policies led to the dismantling of the market and productive service 
infrastructure that had ensured timely marketing and crop quality control 
for Africa’s major cash crop exports since the colonial period (Ponte 
2002).  African peasant farmers’ beverage and other traditional cash crop 
output eroded. 
 
  
Cutbacks in rural health, education and above all agricultural support 
programs produced a widespread malaise.  Western bilateral donors 
increasingly aligned with multi-lateral donors under the leadership of the 
IMF and World Bank to enforce debt conditionality.  SAP was justified in 
the name of ‘getting the prices right’ for smallholders.  In fact, 
smallholders’ quickly realized that the state’s retraction from produce 
markets and input provisioning left them with thin markets and declining 
productivity. In effect, SAP short-circuited the African Green Revolution 
efforts that donors had previously initiated in collaboration with African 
governments.  Aid disbursement to agriculture declined precipitously in 
the 1990s  
 
 
5.3 African farmers in a tilted world market 
 
A long-term secular decline in the terms of trade for agricultural exports 
accompanied the decline in agricultural investment. In OECD countries, 
the falling prices have been offset by extremely high levels of agricultural 
subsidy8 to farmers advantaging them relative to developing country 
farmers.  Most recently, the growth and concentration of private agro-
industrial enterprises has been impacting on commodity, rural labour and 
increasingly land markets.  The uses of biotechnology, global value 
chains, supermarket trade channels and just-in-time production have 
spread (Gibbon and Ponte 2005).  In the face of these tendencies, African 
peasants’ more remote locations and smaller scale of production made it 
more difficult for them to meet delivery market specifications of 
regularity and product standardization (McMichael 1994).9 
 
These trends have widened the productivity gap between smallholder and 
large-scale production.10 Large-scale farmers not only have more land, 
but far more capital investment, which serves to raise land and labour 
productivity.  There are extreme differences between Sub-Saharan Africa 
where farmers’ value added averages $335 as opposed to $39,000 for 
farmers in the United States (World Development Indicators 2007).  
 
The highly capitalized, fossil fuel reliant nature of North American and 
European farmers enables them as a small percentage of the world’s rural 
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population to out compete Asian and African farmers in the global market 
for most commercial export crops.11  Displacement of African and Asian 
farmers in commodity markets is inevitable in the absence of increased 
capital investment in their agriculture.  As the history of North America, 
Europe and Japan demonstrates, there is nothing inherently problematic 
about such displacement if the producers are both willing and able to find 
alternative viable livelihoods.  But given the massive numbers of 
potential ‘economically displaced people’ and the unknowns of this 
historically unprecedented global tidal wave, general belief in world 
commodity markets’ ability to optimize production and welfare for the 
world’s poor has to be treated cautiously.  
 
The gap in value added between African and Asian farmers as opposed to 
the United States and Europe is not simply a difference in economic 
capability and output. Rural ways of life, which have evolved over the 
millennia in Africa, have been finely tuned to the local environment, 
social consensus and political balance.  The undermining of the local 
economies of rural communities suddenly with market shocks or 
gradually with worsening terms of trade, market disincentives and 
obstacles has already and will continue to cause adverse welfare 
repercussions, social upheaval and political destabilization (Havnevik et 
al. 2007). 
 
5.4  Catalyzing State Failure through Market Primacy Policies 
 
Beginning with the World Bank’s Berg report (1982) the African state 
has been blamed for the continent’s agricultural erosion. African 
governments are assumed to be inefficient and corrupt.  The irony is that 
African governments lost their autonomy in policy decision-making in 
the process of debt conditionality and have yet to regain the policy 
initiative.  The West has been increasingly blamed for its double 
standards by which African farmers fertilizer and improved seed 
subsidies were removed while OECD farmers enjoyed generous subsidies 
from their respective governments.  Now, Western government measures 
to subsidize and support their flagging economies during the current 
global recession are in sharp contrast to the stringency of SAP policies 
that Africa countries were subjected to under debt conditionality when 
they plunged into deep recession after the 1970s oil crisis.  
 
Since the 1970s oil crises, African agriculture has seriously declined.  
The continent’s smallholder peasantries have been weakened by a lack of 
agricultural investment and poor producer incentives for decades.  They 
are producing in an ever more erratic world economy of international 
recession.  Meanwhile the volume of commercial staple food demand has 
16 
 
been spurred by rapid urbanization, compounded by increasing reliance 
on foreign importation of rice and wheat as urban dwellers’ preferences 
are swayed towards western dietary patterns.   
 
 
 
Economic liberalization policies of the 1990s and the implementation of 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture have had a marked impact on food 
import patterns particularly for rice and wheat.  Figure 4 shows a very 
pronounced surge in wheat imports in Tanzania. Imported food is 
primarily consumed in urban areas.  The ‘upgrading’ of urban diet with 
the so-called preferred cereals as opposed to local grains and root crops, 
greatly increases dependency on imported food, which has to be 
purchased with African nations’ scarce foreign exchange.  When 
international staple food prices rise, as they did in 2008, vulnerability to 
urban food crisis and food riots, can spread rapidly in cities where there is 
little or no recourse to own farm production.  The hazards of concentrated 
civil unrest for the stability of African nation-states is illustrated by the 
wave of urban food riots in 2008 connected with the spike in world food 
prices.12  
 
 
5.5 Further Agrarian Labour Displacement as the Solution to 
Agrarian Crisis? 
 
The preceding documents the eroding economic sustainability of African 
peasant agriculture.  The conclusion that some policy analysts and others 
draw is that smallholder agriculture is exceptionally backward and should 
be replaced by more efficient agriculture.  There are different visions of 
agrarian directions, some being more open-ended than others. Collier 
(2008) argues for scientifically advanced agriculture using biotechnology.  
The World Bank (2008) advocates scale economies.  Invariably, these 
trajectories entail extensive displacement of peasant smallholders given 
their historically disadvantaged capital assets.  Despite their avowed 
poverty concerns, African government officials and development 
agencies alike tend to tacitly accept smallholder labour displacement as 
necessary for agricultural modernization.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has never had a period for consolidation of its 
productive capacity and has been continually open to commodity price 
fluctuations in the global economy, buffeted by oil price rises and 
agricultural commodity price declines without the cushioning of 
government subsidy.  Despite, the survival of peasant agriculture for 
millennia, the continent has been witnessing its eclipse since the 1970s oil 
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crises.  African small-scale peasant producers now compete with heavily 
subsidized large-scale often corporate, industrialized farming (Round 
2007). 
 
If it is accepted that African smallholders have faced an exceptionally 
hostile global market and policy context for the last three decades, is it 
feasible and worthwhile for national governments and donors to try to 
resuscitate smallholder agricultural productive capacity now?  
 
Answering this question requires distinguishing African producers’ 
radically different circumstances currently compared with before the oil 
crisis.  Processes of deagrarianization and depeasantization are already 
advanced in rural areas across the African continent (Bryceson 1996, 
2000, 2002). Rural economies are more diversified and trade-oriented.  
The average age of rural farmers has increased as youth have migrated 
elsewhere to pursue non-agricultural activities. Nonetheless, the sense of 
rural home areas continues to prevail not just for emotive reasons, but 
because migrants are well aware of the vital importance of an agricultural 
subsistence fallback at their rural place of birth.  These social affinities 
and attendant political loyalties have to be taken into account in policy 
formulation. 
 
Despite more than two decades of non-agricultural work experimentation, 
rural producers face uncertain livelihoods.  A laissez-faire ‘let 
smallholder farmers find work elsewhere’ and ‘let small-scale agriculture 
disappear’ perspective, in the absence of any policy provision for 
alternative non-agricultural employment constitutes gross negligence.  
The politically destabilizing effects of agrarian labour displacement in 
economies without established industrial growth trajectories or other 
alternative economic employment opportunities militate for concerted 
efforts to raise smallholders’ productivity through research, extension and 
input and infrastructural investment.  With such policies, public 
insecurity, violence and civil war are likely to escalate further on the 
African continent. 
 
Historically, peasantries formed the demographic, cultural and political 
bulwark of African nation-states, providing the ethical and social 
foundations upon which national stability has rested.  Thus, on grounds of 
improving human welfare, agricultural productivity and national stability, 
smallholder agriculture as opposed to large-scale capitalized agriculture is 
a more just, conflict-preventing and policy-alleviating policy option.  
 
In the World Bank’s World Development Report 2008 (WDR 2008) the 
market is posited as the arbiter. Smallholder farmers who cannot meet the 
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rigors of the global market are exhorted to achieve economies of scale 
through producer organizations, which are deemed to facilitate 
smallholders’ ability to meet the delivery specifications of global value 
chain. Failing this, they should seek alternatives namely: contract farming 
or wage labour with large-scale agricultural units or leave the agricultural 
sector and engage in rural non-agricultural income-generating activities 
or alternatively, migrate to urban areas. The World Bank (2008) along 
with other donors advocate social protection policies, which are in effect 
safety nets put in place to alleviate the losers’ inevitable economic 
misery.  
 
Since publication of the WDR 2008, the global food price scare has 
served as a wake-up call for western donors. The World Bank, the Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and many other multilateral and 
bilateral donors are distancing themselves from this extreme position. The 
FAO is taking a lead in urging massive investment in smallholder 
agriculture.13 What is most important to first recognize and support is the 
staple food-producing capacity of peasant agriculture. In a ‘better late 
than never’ attempt to resuscitate the African Green Revolution that SAP 
short-circuited in the 1980s, donors are now scrambling to think of ways 
of boosting smallholder agriculture. The Bill and Melinda Gates-funded 
AGRA program, to its credit, has already been mobilizing resources to 
address the problem. It intends to invest heavily in improving agricultural 
research, extension and input packages for African smallholders prior to 
the food price scare. It is early days yet for evaluating the programme and 
its impact on small-scale African agriculture and it remains to be seen 
how steadfast donors will be in pursuing agricultural productivity 
improvements in the face of global recession. What is clear, however, is 
that African farmers, who have been deprived of research, extension and 
marketing support for decades, are eager to receive yield-enhancing input 
packages.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The record of African agricultural performance has been poor over the 
last three decades in line with exceptionally slow economic growth 
overall, yet in the last few years has seen spurts of around 3 percent. 
These improvements appear to be a result of the rising commodity prices 
in the global economy rather than an underlying shift in the production 
conditions in African agriculture.  
 
The hypothesis that the long-term poor agricultural performance in 
African countries is a consequence of ‘poor governance’, was taken up in 
this paper as Hypothesis A. The results of our estimations showed that a 
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higher level of public security conducive with lower levels of conflicts of 
an ethnic, religious, and regional nature, correspond with greater 
agricultural value added per capita.14  It is interesting that FDI, trade 
openness and aid did not have a substantial impact on agricultural 
development, calling into question the view that further African market 
involvement is likely to improve the income and livelihoods of 
smallholder farmers. So while more public security is favourable to 
agricultural development, it is unlikely that greater openness and trade are 
the solution to agricultural development, particularly as the current spike 
in agricultural growth appears to be largely due to rising commodity 
prices rather than an increased volume of trade.  
 
Our Hypothesis B that the policies of the international institutions and 
donors have caused a fall in agricultural investment and catalyzed the 
fragility of African states has also been explored here using a historical 
narrative. The negative impact of the oil shocks of the 1970s, followed by 
the SAPs in the 1980s and economic liberalization in the 1990s have 
resulted in a far weaker agricultural sector. As the African economies met 
the harsh economic conditionalities imposed by international financial 
institutions they were forced to reduce investment in agricultural research 
and technologies and abandon Green Revolution efforts similar to those 
that were completed in Asia. . The straitjacketing and decline of African 
agriculture occurred at a time when farmers in Western economies were 
being supported by generous subsidies from their governments.  
 
Therefore, we argue that the explanation for the poor performance of 
African agriculture does not automatically lead to the door of African 
governments but first and foremost to the corridors of power in Western 
governments and large-scale western agricultural concerns and interests. 
The solution to poor agricultural performance does not lie in further 
exposing Africa’s smallholder farmers in their present weakened stated to 
the gale force winds of global trade and imbalanced agricultural 
commodity market competition but to improving the ability of African 
farmers to benefit from new agrarian technologies that raise staple food 
productivity, and thereby national stability. It is only through these efforts 
that countries can move away from labour displacement, food insecurity 
and fragile states that generate the public insecurity, violence and civil 
war that Africa has become associated with internationally.   
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Table 1:  Per Capita GDP Growth by Region and Economic 
Grouping, 1981-2007 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2007) 
  Average Annual Growth (%) Overall 
Growth 
(%) 
  1981-1989 1990-2002 2003-2007 1981-
2007 
World 1.4 1.2 2.3 41.4 
Developed 
economies 
2.5 1.8 2.08 67.5 
Economies in 
transition 
1.9 -4 7.3 -25.8 
Developing 
economies 
1.7 3 5 112.5 
Of which:         
Africa -0.5 0.3 3 16.4 
America -0.3 1.1 3.5 22.7 
West Asia -1.7 1.1 4.1 16 
East and South Asia 5.1 5.3 6.3 317.5 
 
 
Table 2:  World Primary Commodity Prices,  
2002-2006 (percentage change) 
 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
Commodity Group 2002-2006 
___________________________________________________________ 
Food and Tropical Beverages   48.4 
Agricultural raw materials   62.3 
Minerals, ores and metals 219.9 
Crude petroleum 157.6 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD 
Commodity Price Bulletin, Various issues, and UNSD, Monthly Bulletin 
of Statistics, various issues.  Adapted from UNCTAD (2007) 
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Table 3:  Sectoral and GDP Growth by Region.   
Annual Growth Rates, 1990-1992 to 2005-2007 
 
 
 
     
 Location Growth 1990-92-->2005-07    GDP  Agriculture Industry Services   
 
LOW AND MIDDLE 
INCOME 4.66 2.83 5.46 4.94   
 EAST ASIA 8.41 3.52 10.21 8.41   
 
EUROPE and CENTRAL 
ASIA 2.12         
 
LATIN AMERICA and 
CARIBBEAN 3.10 2.51 2.79 3.48   
 
MIDDLE EAST and 
NORTH AFRICA 3.96 3.31   4.07   
 SOUTH ASIA 6.01 
3
6.63 7.41   
 SUB SAHARAN AFRICA 3.39 3.14 3.23 3.35   
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators
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Table 4:  Food Production Growth Rate by Region,  
1990-92 to 2002-04 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank World Development  
Indicators
    
 Location Food Production   1990-92-->2002-2004  
 LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME 2.97  
 EAST ASIA 5.16  
 EUROPE and CENTRAL ASIA    
 LATIN AMERICA and CARIBBEAN 3.63  
 MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA 3.69  
 SOUTH ASIA 2.9  
 SUB SAHARAN AFRICA 2.77  
 
 
Table 5  Trend Growth in Sub-Saharan Agriculture since 1970 
 
Series Constant, 
 a 
Time 
Coefficient, 
b 
Adjusted  
R Square 
Estimation 
Procedure 
Value 
Added in 
Agriculture 
(2000 US $) 
23.77** .025** .99 AR(1) 
Food 
Production 
Index (1999-
2001 = 100) 
3.63** .023** .99 AR(1) 
Population 3.49 .027** 0.99 AR(2) 
 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators
 Table 6:   Agricultural Value Added Per Worker, 1990-92 and 2001-03.  
Growth Rate 1990-92 to 2001-03 Sectoral Shares in GDP 
Countries Agricultural value-added 
per worker (in 2000 $) 
Value added as percentage of 
GDP 
  1990-92 2001-03 Annual 
growth 
rate (%)
Agriculture Industry Services 
Low & Mid 
Income 
388 521 
2.05 
12 43 45 
e. Asia & 
Pacific 
303 412 
2.83 
12 46 42 
Europe & 
C. Asia 
1844 1938 
0.44 
9 30 61 
L. America 
& 
Caribbean 
2152 2856 
2.63 
6 30 63 
M. East & 
N. Africa 
1581 1928 
1.82 
11 41 48 
South Asia 340 393 1.36 18 28 54 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
304 325 
0.62 
15 32 52 
 
Source: World Bank economic indicators 
 Table 7: Principal Components Analysis of Variables of Public Security  
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
  
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 2.33608 1.02304 0.4672 0.4672 
Comp2 1.31304 0.652681 0.2626 0.7298 
Comp3 0.660356 0.26078 0.1321 0.8619 
Comp4 0.399576 0.108625 0.0799 0.9418 
Comp5 0.290951 . 0.0582 1.0000 
 
 
Principle Components 
(Eigenvectors)    
Variable1 Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Standardised Weights 
a2000 0.5155 -0.0124 -0.6545 -0.2583 0.4889 0.17 
a2001 0.4842 0.2003 0.6509 -0.5436 0.0789 0.2 
a2002 0.5483 0.096 0.2104 0.7938 0.1254 0.2 
a2003 0.1244 0.7947 -0.2935 -0.0227 -0.516 0.19 
a2004 -0.4287 0.5647 0.1321 0.0842 0.6876 0.25 
 
 
1 A2000: Security of persons and goods, A2000; 
A2001:Conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature, A2001; 
A2002:Violent actions by underground political organizations; 
A2003:Organized criminal activity (drug-trafficking, arms-
trafficking); 
A2004: Violent social conflicts.  
 
Source: ‘Profils Institutionnels’ (available on line: 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsInstitutionnelsDatabase.htm) 
 Table 8   Institutions and Sub-Saharan agriculture:  A fixed effects vector 
decomposition (FEVD) analysis 
 
Regressors 1 etc  I II III 
FDIGDP 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 
TRDGDP -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
AIDPC -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
A200 0.073**   
A2001  0.098**  
A2004  0.005  
A250   0.059** 
B403 -0.049** -0.065** -0.046** 
B703 0.026** 0.018** 0.013* 
Constant 4.37** 4.382** 4.522** 
Adjusted R Square 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic2 
1.38 
(1.074234) 
1.37 
(1.080917) 
1.39 
(1.072251) 
Hausman Test 
(random effect vis-à-
vis FEVD) statistic, 
(probability) 
10.29 
 ( 0.1128) 
10.21 
 (0.1771) 
9.32 
 (0.1564) 
 
*  Significant at 5 per cent level. 
**   Significant at 1 per cent level. 
1 FDIGDP = Net FDI inflow as % of GDP; 
 TRDGDP = (Exports plus Imports) as 5 of GDP; 
AIDPC = Aid per capita (current US$); 
A200 =  Internal public security varying from 1 = low to 4 = high; 
A2001 = Conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature varying from 1 =  
severe conflicts to 4= no conflicts; 
A2004 = Violent social conflicts varying from 1 = extremely violent to 
4=low degree of violence; 
A250 = Evolution of the security in the past 3 years varying from 
severely deteriorated (0), deteriorated (1), remained stable (2), 
moderately improved (3), substantially improved (4); 
B403 = Administered prices and market prices varying from 1 = large 
proportion to 4 = very small proportion or nil; 
B703 = Concentration of agricultural land varying from 1 = highly 
concentrated to 4 = highly dispersed. 
2 Durbin-Watson statistic of the transformed equation – AR(1) Prais-
Winsten transformation is used for curing the problem of autocorrelation 
 in the residuals. Durbin-Watson statistic of the original equation is given 
in parentheses. 
3 The null hypothesis (difference in coefficients not systematic), Ho is 
accepted in each case. FEVD estimates are efficient under Ho.  
 
Source: Estimated from data available in  ‘Profils Institutionnels’ (available on 
line: http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsInstitutionnelsDatabase.htm) and World Bank 
World Development Indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Notes 
 
1 The referee asks why we did not study the dynamics of the movement of the 
commodity prices.  The simple answer is that this was not the object of the 
paper.  The rise in commodity prices was being cited only as a reason for the 
possible relaxation of the balance of payments constraint, and for indicating the 
impact of the latter on agricultural and overall production.  See further 
UNCTAD (2008) 
 
2 The referee has queried the meaning of these dates.  They simply measure the 
change from an average of the figures for 1990, 1991, 1992 to the average of 
the figures for 2005, 2006, 2007.  Instead of taking the end points to be the 
output of a singe year, this procedure takes the average of three years as the end 
point.  This provides a better measure of change as it reduces the stochastic 
variation at the terminal points. 
 
3 This is one of the most important tables in this section. It covers the period 
1970-2007. The referee seems to have overlooked the significance of this table 
for the argument of this section. It does cover a period of three to four decades.  
 
4 See for example Stiglitz 2002 ,and  Stein (2008) 
 
5 On the theory of structural change, see the classic studies by S. Kuznets, N. 
Kaldor, and H. Chenery, For recent contributions to the literature see Dasgupta 
and Singh, 2004, 2005. 
 
6 Stewart and Brown (2009) indicate that the conflict over oil in Nigeria is 
exacerbated by the fact that the rising oil revenues occur in a context where 
there has been a fall in agricultural investment in Nigeria since 1970, which was 
previously the mainstay of the economy. As agriculture still employs about 70 
per cent of the country’s population and accounts for 40 per cent of GDP there 
is heightened relative inequality in the oil rich region of the country. 
 
7 Asia’s Green Revolution efforts had started almost a decade before those of 
Africa and had not only registered success but also achieved sustainability by 
the late 1970s. With national economies strengthened by reliable domestic food 
production, they were far less vulnerable to debt and the imposition of SAP the 
aftermath of the 1970s oil crises.  
 
8 In 2006, almost $286 billion was paid to OECD farmers in the form of 
subsidies, which amounted to approximately 27 per cent of their total farm 
receipts (OECD).  
 
 9 The EU (2007) has voiced its concern for smallholders: ‘Globalisation and the 
increasing role of trade, changing food markets (with longer food chains) and 
integration of agricultural supplies (retail concentration) impact on agriculture. 
This provides increased opportunities as well as a risk of marginalisation of 
resource-poor non-commercial farmers, particularly in developing countries.’  
 
10 Large-scale farming is defined here as capitalized agricultural enterprises 
operating as businesses often of a corporate nature, using wage and salaried 
labour, deploying intensive agricultural techniques to maximize commercial 
output. Smallholder farming on the other hand entails family labour producing 
for commercial sale and household subsistence. 
 
11 This is increasingly the case as biotechnology conquers barriers to tropical 
plant production in temperate climates. 
 
12 A succession of food riots occurred in February and March 2008 concentrated 
in West Africa Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mauritania and Cameroon in February 
2008,  
(http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=76905), followed by 
Mogadishu, Somalia in May 2008 ‘Two killed as Somalis riot over high food 
prices’ (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24463508/) 
 
13 At a recent UN summit, Jacques Diouf, Director-General of the FAO, called 
for $22 billion pledged by governments since June 2008 to be released to 
address rising global food prices (‘The Poor Still Face Hunger’, New Scientist, 
31 January, 2009).  
 
14 This result is in keeping with the concept of Horizontal Inequalities put forth 
by Frances Stewart. The importance of public delivery by the state is regarded 
as a measure of state effectiveness (Stewart and Brown 2008). 
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